Denying Private Attorney Fee Recovery Under
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I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1980, Congress enacted the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA)l
to require and to encourage the cleanup of property contaminated by hazardous substances. The statute establishes a strict
liability regime under which anyone falling within several
broad categories of responsible parties is required, without
regard to 2fault, to pay for cleaning up the hazardous
substances.
The CERCLA statutory scheme incorporates public and private enforcement mechanisms. The federal government may
enforce the statute's requirements either by ordering responsible parties to clean up contamination 3 or by cleaning up contamination itself and then recovering its costs from responsible
4
parties.
Recognizing the inherent budgetary and political limitations of federal enforcement, Congress authorized private
enforcement of CERCLA's requirements. 5 Section 107(a)(4)(B)
makes responsible parties liable for "any other necessary costs
of response incurred by any other person consistent with the
national contingency plan."6 Whether a private party is entitled to recover its attorneys' fees under CERCLA depends on
whether Congress intended to include litigation expenses and
attorneys' fees in the phrase "necessary costs of response."
* Attorney, Bogle & Gates, Seattle, Washington. A.B. 1985, Dartmouth College;
J.D. 1989, Harvard Law School. The Author wishes to thank Beth Ginsberg, Anne
Seidel, and Denise Maes for their insightful comments and helpful suggestions.
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988).
2. Id. § 9607.
3. Id.
4. Id. §§ 9604(a), 9607(a)(4)(A).
5. See H.R. REP. No. 253, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 55 (1985), reprintedin 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835, 2837; see also 40 C.F.R. § 300 app. B (1992) (listing more than 1000

sites on the National Priorities List that are awaiting cleanup).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B) (1988).
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In Stanton Road Associates v. Lohrey Enterprises,7 a
divided panel of the Ninth Circuit held that private parties
could not recover their attorneys' fees in cost recovery actions
brought pursuant to CERCLA section 107(a)(4)(B).' In reaching its decision, the court expressly rejected reasoning previously adopted by the Eighth Circuit.9 The court's holding in
Stanton Road represents a step backward for hazardous waste
law. The court avoided any serious analysis of CERCLA's language and legislative history by almost ritualistically invoking
7. 984 F.2d 1015 (9th Cir. 1993).
8. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B) (1988). On the same day that it decided Stanton
Road, the Ninth Circuit decided Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 984 F.2d 1025 (9th
Cir. 1993), which also concerned the recovery of attorneys' fees by private parties under
CERCLA.
9. Stanton Road, 984 F.2d at 1019-20; see Gopher Oil Co. v. Union Oil Co., 955 F.2d
519 (8th Cir. 1992); General Elec. Co. v. Litton Indus. Automation Sys., 920 F.2d 1415
(8th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1390 (1991). The Sixth Circuit recently held that
private parties may recover their attorneys' fees under CERCLA. See Donahey v. Bogle,
987 F.2d 1250 (6th Cir. 1993). The Third Circuit has previously awarded attorneys' fees
to a prevailing plaintiff in a CERCLA § 107 action, although it has not directly
confronted the issue. See Jersey City Redevelopment Auth. v. PPG Indus., 28 Env't
Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1873, 1881 (3d Cir. Dec. 28, 1988). Since Stanton Road, both the First
and Tenth Circuits have held that private parties may not recover litigation attorneys'
fees in CERCLA actions. See FMC Corp. v. Aero Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 842 (10th Cir.
1993); In re Hemingway Transp., Inc., 993 F.2d 915, 934-35 (1st Cir. 1993).
The federal district courts that have addressed this issue are divided. In the
following cases, courts held that private parties may recover their attorneys' fees. BTR
Dunlop v. Rockwell Intl Corp., No. 90 C 7414, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1720, at *1 (N.D.
Ill. Feb. 12, 1993) (magistrate's recommendation); Hastings Bldg. Prod., Inc. v. National
Aluminum Corp., 815 F. Supp. 228,232 (W.D. Mich. 1993); Chesapeake & Potomac Tel.
Co. v. Peck Iron & Metal Co., 814 F. Supp. 1281, 1285 (E.D. Va. 1993); Joy v. Louisiana
Conf. Ass'n of Seventh-Day Adventists, No. 91-4025, 1992 WL 165670, at *3 (E.D. La.
July 1, 1992); Bolin v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 759 F. Supp. 692, 710 (D. Kan. 1991); Pease
& Curren Refining, Inc. v. Spectrolab, Inc., 744 F. Supp. 945, 950-51 (C.D. Cal. 1990);
Shapiro v. Alexanderson, 741 F. Supp. 472, 480 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); Lykins v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 27 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1590, 1594 (E.D. Ky. Feb. 29,
1988).
In contrast, courts in the following cases have held that private parties may not
recover their attorneys' fees. United States Steel Supply Inc. v. Alco Standard Corp., 36
Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1330, 1342-43 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 9, 1992); Alloy Briquetting Corp. v.
Niagara Vest Inc., 802 F. Supp. 943, 945-47 (W.D.N.Y. 1992); Anspec Co. v. Johnson
Controls, Inc., 788 F. Supp. 951, 958 (E.D. Mich. 1992); Price v. United States Navy, 818
F. Supp. 1326, 1331 n.9 (S.D. Cal. 1992); Ellman v. Woo, 34 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1969,
1974 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 16, 1991); Santa Fe Pac. Realty Corp. v. United States, 780 F. Supp.
687, 696 (E.D. Cal. 1991); Leonard Partnership v. Town of Chenango, 779 F. Supp. 223,
229-30 (N.D.N.Y. 1991); Fallowfield Dev. Corp. v. Strunk, 766 F. Supp. 335, 337-38
(E.D. Pa. 1991); New York v. SCA Serv. Inc., 754 F. Supp. 995, 1000 (S.D.N.Y. 1991);
United States v. Hardage, 750 F. Supp. 1460, 1511 (W.D. Okla. 1990), affd on other
grounds, 982 F.2d 1436 (10th Cir. 1992); Mesiti v, Microdot, Inc., 739 F. Supp. 57, 62-63
(D.N.H. 1990); Regan v. Cherry Corp., 706 F. Supp. 145, 149 (D.R.I. 1989); T & E Indus.
v. Safety Light Corp., 680 F. Supp. 696, 708 n.13 (D.N.J. 1988).
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the American Rule against fee shifting. The court's decision
also undermines CERCLA's broad remedial purposes by eliminating an important incentive to clean up hazardous substances
voluntarily.
This Article argues that the Ninth Circuit decision in Stanton Road was wrong. Section II of this Article describes the
majority and dissenting opinions in Stanton Road. Section III
argues that the majority misread Supreme Court precedent,
leading it to adopt an excessively formalistic approach to statutory construction. It argues that the majority should have used
traditional approaches to statutory construction and that those
approaches would have produced a different result. Finally, the
Article concludes by arguing that the Ninth Circuit's decision
distorts the intent of Congress in enacting CERCLA and hinders private efforts to clean up hazardous waste.
II.

THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S

HOLDING IN STAITON ROAD

Stanton Road presented the CERCLA attorney fee issue to
the Ninth Circuit in a relatively straightforward and uncomplicated form. The defendant, Lohrey Enterprises (Lohrey),
owned and operated a dry cleaning plant on property next to
property owned by the plaintiff, Stanton Road Associates (Stanton Road). Hazardous chemicals spilled onto Stanton Road's
property during the dry cleaning plant's operation. Stanton
Road brought an action against Lohrey seeking response costs
and declaratory relief under CERCLA. 10 Stanton Road prevailed at trial and recovered $77,374 for costs incurred in cleaning up the contamination and $126,198 in attorneys' fees.'1
Stanton Road also obtained a declaratory judgment holding
Lohrey liable for the future costs associated with cleaning up
the contamination, which were expected to exceed one million
dollars. 12 On appeal, Lohrey challenged the district court's
award of attorneys' fees under CERCLA."3
Judge Alarcon, joined by Judge Sneed, wrote the majority's
14
opinion, reversing the district court's award of attorneys' fees.
10. Stanton Road, 984 F.2d at 1016.
11. Id. at 1017. Stanton Road also recovered $389,925 in damages under state law.

Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. The district court's order that Lohrey place $1,100,000 in escrow for the
cleanup of contamination on Stanton Road's property was also at issue on appeal. Id. at
1020-21.
14. Id. at 1016.
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The majority's analysis began with the American Rule, which
provides that a prevailing party is generally not entitled to
recover its attorneys' fees. 15 The majority argued that under
the Supreme Court's holdings in Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v.
Wilderness Society16 and Runyon v. McCrary,17 a federal court

may award attorneys' fees to a prevailing party only if Congress
has expressly and unambiguously departed from the American
Rule and authorized the award of fees.' 8 The majority concluded that CERCLA contained no such unambiguous, express
authorization." 9

Two provisions of CERCLA are relevant in determining
whether a private party may recover its attorneys' fees. Section
107(a) provides the following:
Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law, and subject only to the defenses set forth in subsection (b) of this section(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or operated any facility at which such
hazardous substances were disposed of,
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise

arranged for disposal or treatment, or arranged with a trans-

porter for transport for disposal or treatment, of hazardous
substances owned or possessed by such person, by any other
party or entity, at any facility or incineration vessel owned or
operated by another party or entity and containing such hazardous substances, and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous
substance for transport... shall be liable for(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by
the United States Government or a State or an Indian tribe
not inconsistent with the national contingency plan;

(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any
other person consistent with the national contingency plan;
(C) damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources, including the reasonable costs of assessing such
injury, destruction, or loss resulting from such a release; and
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Id. at 1018.
421 U.S. 240 (1975).
427 U.S. 160 (1976).
Stanton Road, 984 F.2d at 1018-19.
Id. at 1019.
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(D) the costs of any health assessment or health effects
study carried out under section 9604(i) of this title.20
Section 101(25) defines response as follows:
The term "respond" or "response" means remove, removal,
remedy, and remedial action; all such terms (including the
terms "removal" and "remedial action") include enforcement
activities related thereto. 2 '
The majority concluded that although these sections authorize
recovery of the costs related to "enforcement activities," the sections do not "explicitly authorize the payment of attorneys'
fees."22 The majority compared the statute's reference to
enforcement activities with its other references to "legal . . .
23
and "attorney... fees" 2 4 and concluded that "Congress
costs"
has repeatedly demonstrated that it knows how to express its
intention to create an exception to the American Rule." 2 5 The
majority acknowledged that, in a general sense, a private
response cost action is an enforcement action, but the majority
explained that the Ninth Circuit had never considered whether
a private cost action is an enforcement activity in the26context of
an attorneys' fees award under section 107(a)(4)(B).
Finally, the majority refused to consider the policies and
purposes underlying CERCLA. Relying on Alyeska, the majority explained that "[w]e cannot imply authority to award attorneys' fees because we determine that such a rule would enhance
public policy."27
Judge Canby dissented, arguing that private cost recovery
actions are properly seen as enforcement activities within the
CERCLA scheme.28 He noted that the majority failed to give
any meaning to Congress' decision to amend CERCLA in 1986
to add enforcement activities to the definition of response
costs. 29 Judge Canby concluded that the award of attorneys'
20. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988) (emphasis added).
21. Id. § 9601(25).
22. Stanton Road, 984 F.2d at 1019.
23. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(b) (1988).
24. Id. § 9659(0.
25. Stanton Road, 984 F.2d at 1019.
26. Id. at 1018. The Ninth Circuit has twice described private cost recovery actions
as enforcement actions. See Cadillac Fairview/California Inc. v. Dow Chem. Co., 840
F.2d 691, 694 (9th Cir. 1988); Wickland Oil Terminals v. Asarco, Inc., 792 F.2d 887, 892
(9th Cir. 1986).
27. Stanton Road, 984 F.2d at 1020.
28. Id. at 1022-24 (Canby, J., dissenting).

29. Id. at 1023.
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fees furthered CERCLA's basic purposes of encouraging the

prompt cleanup of hazardous waste sites and imposing the cost
of cleanups on the responsible parties. 0
III.

THE STANTON ROAD MAJORITY MISREAD PRECEDENT,
IGNORED TRADITIONAL METHODS OF STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION, AND CAME TO THE WRONG

RESULT
The majority in Stanton Road came to the wrong conclusion. More importantly, the majority misinterpreted Supreme
Court precedent to impose a general rule against awarding
attorneys' fees and, as a result, ignored traditional approaches
to statutory construction.
A.

The Majority Misread PrecedentRegarding the
American Rule

The majority's analysis began and ended with the American Rule and the Supreme Court's commands in Alyeska and
Runyon. The majority misread those cases, however, to require
an unambiguous statutory authorization to award attorneys'
fees. Those cases, in fact, merely require some indication that
Congress intended to permit fee awards.
In Alyeska and Runyon, the Supreme Court held that
courts could not award attorneys' fees in the absence of Congress' expressed intent to authorize their award. The Supreme
Court did not, as the majority contends, hold that a court may
never award attorneys' fees whenever the relevant statutory
language is ambiguous. 3 1 The Supreme Court insisted on a
statutory authorization of attorneys' fees, but not necessarily an

authorization that is completely unambiguous. 2
In Alyeska, the plaintiffs sought an injunction to prohibit
the issuance of various rights-of-way to oil companies. The
plaintiffs argued that the rights-of-way would violate the Min30. Id. at 1024.
31. See id. at 1019 (The rule set forth in Alyeska and Runyon, however, precludes
us from implying from ambiguous language an intent that attorneys' fees can be
awarded in a private response action.").
32. The Supreme Court has insisted on an unambiguous expression of
Congressional intent in other contexts. See, e.g., Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473
U.S. 234, 241 (1985) ("Congress may abrogate the State's constitutionally secured
immunity from suit in federal court only by making its intention unmistakably clear in
the language of the statute.").
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eral Leasing Act of 192033 and the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969.3' The D.C. Circuit concluded that the plaintiffs
were entitled to recover their attorneys' fees, but the Supreme
Court reversed . 5 Significantly, neither the Court nor the plaintiffs pointed to any provision in either statute that could have
been interpreted to authorize the award. Instead, the question
before the Court was whether there should be a broad judicially
created exception to the American Rule for litigants who have
acted to vindicate important statutory rights.3 6 The Court
refused to create such an exception and instead left it to Congress to authorize the award of attorneys' fees by statute.3 7 The
Court explained as follows:
It is true that under some, if not most, of the statutes providing for the allowance of reasonable fees, Congress has opted
to rely heavily on private enforcement to implement public
policy and to allow counsel fees so as to encourage private
But congressional utilization of the privatelitigation ....
attorney-general concept can in no sense be construed as a
grant of authority to the Judiciary to jettison the traditional
rule against nonstatutory allowances to the prevailing party
and to award attorneys' fees whenever the courts deem the
public policy furthered by a particular statute important
enough to warrant the award.3 8
In Runyon, the plaintiffs brought actions under 42 U.S.C
§ 198131 and Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 196440 against a
school refusing to admit African American students. The district court awarded the plaintiffs their attorneys' fees, the court
of appeals reversed, and the Supreme Court affirmed. 4 1 The
plaintiffs argued that 42 U.S.C. § 1988,42 which confers broad
jurisdiction on the district courts to remedy civil rights violations, authorized the district court's attorneys' fee award.43 The
Supreme Court rejected the plaintiffs' argument, but not
33.
34.
35.
36.

30 U.S.C. § 185 (1988).
42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1988).
Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 241 (1975).
See id. at 245-47.

37. Id. at 269-71.
38. Id. at 263.
39. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988).
40. Id. § 2000c. The plaintiffs' attorney withdrew their Title II claim before trial.
Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 164 n.2 (1976).
41. Runyon, 427 U.S. at 182.
42. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988).
43. Runyon, 427 U.S. at 184.
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because § 1988 was ambiguous." Rather, the Court considered
§ 1988's language and legislative history and concluded that
Congress did not intend to authorize the award of attorneys'
fees through the jurisdictional provision.45
A court applying Alyeska and Runyon, therefore, must look
to a statute and interpret its provisions in light of the traditional rules of statutory construction. If the court is unable to
discern a Congressional intent to authorize the award of attorneys' fees, the court may not award attorneys' fees. The Stanton Road majority's opinion is problematic precisely because the
majority refused to engage in this type of traditional statutory
analysis. Instead, the majority misread Alyeska and Runyon to
rigidly preclude attorneys' fee awards except when the statutory authorization is absolutely unambiguous.
B. TraditionalApproaches to Statutory Interpretation
Produce a Different Result
Instead of abandoning any attempt to interpret an ambiguous statutory provision, the Stanton Road majority should have
employed the traditional methods of statutory interpretation.
Three basic rules of statutory construction are particularly relevant in this context: First, a court should consider the plain
meaning of the statutory language.46 Second, a court should
interpret a statute in a way as to give each part meaning.4 7
Third, a court should interpret a statutory provision in a way
that would further the purposes underlying the statutory
scheme.48
1. The Statute's Plain Meaning
When read together, section 107(a)(4)(B), which allows a
private party to recover response costs, and section 101(25),
which defines "response" to include "enforcement activities
related thereto," clearly authorize the recovery of costs associ44. Id. at 185.
45. Id. at 186.

46. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108
(1980); Seldovia Native Ass'n v. Lujan, 904 F.2d 1335, 1341 (9th Cir. 1990).
47. See In re Oxborrow, 913 F.2d 751, 754 (9th Cir. 1990); Beisler v. Commissioner,

814 F.2d 1304, 1307 (9th Cir. 1987).
48. See Wilshire Westwood Assoc. v. Atlantic Richfield Corp., 881 F.2d 801, 804
(9th Cir. 1989); Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 805 F.2d 1074,
1081 (1st Cir. 1986); New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1045 (2d Cir.

1985).

1993]

Attorney Fee Recovery Under CERCLA

ated with enforcement activities. However, two questions
remain. First, do costs of enforcement activities under CERCLA include attorneys' fees? Second, are private response cost
recovery actions enforcement activities within the meaning of
section 101(25)?
The answer to the first question seems simple. Anyone
enforcing the technical legal regime established by CERCLA
requires attorneys and accompanying litigation expenses.49
CERCLA's provision allowing the recovery of the costs of
enforcement activities, therefore, cannot be reasonably interpreted to exclude the recovery of attorneys' fees incurred in the
course of those activities.
If a court assumes that the attorneys' fees incurred in connection with enforcement activities are recoverable, the remaining question is whether section 107(a)(4)(B) cost recovery
actions brought by private parties are enforcement activities
within the meaning of section 101(25). "Enforce" is typically
defined to mean "to give force to," "to put in force, [to] cause to
take effect."50 Private litigation does just that; it effectuates the
requirements of CERCLA. 51
As the Stanton Road majority acknowledged, the Ninth
Circuit has previously referred to private cost recovery actions
as enforcement actions in other contexts.52 The majority failed,
however, to explain why private cost recovery actions should
not be considered to be enforcement activities in this context.
The majority's Alyeska and Runyon analysis is simply beside
the point. Congress clearly authorized the recovery of enforcement costs. Even a presumption against attorneys' fees awards
would not be relevant to a determination of what constitutes an
enforcement activity under CERCLA.
49. See General Elec. Co. v. Litton Indus. Automation Sys., 920 F.2d 1415, 1422
(8th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1390 (1991). The federal government has sought
recovery of its litigation costs and attorneys' fees based on the combination of
§ 107(aX4XA), which permits the government to recover "all costs of removal or
remedial action," and § 101(25)'s definition of "removal" and "remedial" that includes
enforcement activities. See United States v. Mottolo, 695 F. Supp. 615, 631 (D.N.H.
1988).
50. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEw INTERNATIONAL DIcTIoNARY 751 (1981).

51. See GeneralElec., 920 F.2d at 1422 ("A private party cost-recovery action ...is
an enforcement activity within the meaning of the statute.").
52. Stanton Road Assocs. v. Lohrey Enters., 984 F.2d 1015, 1018 (9th Cir. 1993);
see Cadillac Fairview/California Inc., v. Dow Chem. Co., 840 F.2d 691, 694 (9th Cir.
1988); Wickland Oil Terminals v. Asarco, Inc., 792 F.2d 887, 892 (9th Cir. 1986).

96
2.
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Recovery of Attorneys' Fees is Necessary to Give Meaning
to Congress' Amendment of Section 101(25) in 1986

The most serious flaw in the majority's opinion is its complete failure to offer an interpretation of CERCLA sections
107(a)(4)(B) and 101(25) that gives any meaning to the phrase
"all such terms . . . include enforcement activities related
thereto." 3 The majority concluded that this phrase is not an
unambiguous authorization to award attorneys' fees, but at the
same time failed to explain what purpose the phrase serves.5 4
As Judge Canby's dissent noted, Congress amended CERCLA in 1986 and added the phrase "all such terms (including
the terms 'removal and remedial action') include enforcement
activities related thereto" to section 101(25)'s definition of
"response."5 The legislative history supports the dissent's position. 56 As one court explained, "Congress intended for 'enforcement activities' to include attorney's fees expended to induce a
responsible party to comply with the remedial actions mandated by CERCLA. This Court cannot ascertain any other logical interpretation which would give effect to this phrase. " "
The defendant in Stanton Road argued that the phrase
"enforcement activities" refers only to actions brought by the
federal government and, consequently, that CERCLA authorizes only the federal government to recover its attorneys' fees
and response costs. 58 This interpretation is unsupported by the
statutory language. CERCLA section 107(a)(4) authorizes federal, state, and tribal cost recovery in a subparagraph different
from the subparagraph authorizing cost recovery by private
parties. Section 107(a)(4)(A) provides that responsible parties
will be liable for "all costs of removal or remedial action incurred
53. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(25) (1988).
54. Stanton Road, 984 F.2d at 1019.
55. Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499,
§ 101(e), 100 Stat. 1613, 1615.
56. See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 962, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 183, 185 (1986), reprintedin
1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3276, 3278. Although an earlier House Committee Report indicated
that the amendment was designed to "confirm EPA's authority to recover costs for
enforcement actions," the focus on EPA was deleted from the Conference Report and
makes little sense in light of Congress' decision to amend § 10's definition of"response"
rather than its definition of "removal" or "remedial action." See H.R. REP. No. 253, 99th
Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 66-67 (1985), reprintedin 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835, 2848-49.
57. Pease & Curren Refining, Inc. v. Spectrolab, Inc., 744 F. Supp. 945, 951 (C.D.
Cal. 1990).
58. See Appellants' Opening Brief at 38-39, Stanton Road (No. 91-15729); see also
United States v. Hardage, 750 F. Supp. 1460, 1511 (W.D. Okla. 1990); T & E Indus. v.
Safety Light Corp., 680 F. Supp. 696, 708 n.13 (D.N.J. 1988).
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by the United States Government or a State or an Indian tribe
not inconsistent with the national contingency plan."5 9 Section
107(a)(4)(B), in contrast, makes responsible parties liable for
"any other necessary costs of response incurred by any otherperson consistent with the national contingency plan." 0 In 1986,
Congress expressly included enforcement activities in the definition of "response," a term that only appears in section
107(a)(4)(B)'s private cost recovery provision. Congress' amendment of section 101(25) to include enforcement activities within
the definition of "response," as well as within the definitions of
"removal" and "remedial action," would be rendered ineffective
and meaningless unless enforcement activities are interpreted
to include private cost recovery actions.6 1
CERCLA's legislative history makes clear that Congress
intended private parties to play an important, and perhaps
even a dominant, role in the enforcement of the statute. 2 Congress knew that government-sponsored cleanups would be
insufficient to solve the problem of hazardous substance
releases and that private parties would have to take the lead in
cleaning up many sites.6 3 Because the EPA alone cannot
enforce CERCLA, private response cost recovery actions play an
64
essential role in enforcing the statute.
59. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A) (1988) (emphasis added).
60. Id. § 9607(a)(4)(B) (emphasis added).
61. See Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. Peck Iron & Metal Co., 814 F. Supp.
1281, 1283 (E.D. Va. 1993).
Congress specifically included "enforcement activities" in the definition of
"respond" or "response'-the terms particularly applicable to cost recovery
actions by private litigants. If Congress did not contemplate that private
parties could perform "enforcement activities," it would have defined only the
terms applicable to governmental entities-i.e., "remove" or "removal" and
"remedy" or "remedial action"-to include "enforcement activities," or it would
have defined enforcement activities as applying only to actions brought by the
federal government.
Id. (citations omitted); Pease & Curren, 744 F. Supp. at 951.
62. See H.R. REP. No. 253, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 55 (1985), reprinted in
1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835, 2837 ("It is clear from the accumulating data on waste sites
that EPA will never have adequate moneys or manpower to address the problem itself.
As a result .... Congress must facilitate cleanups of hazardous substances by the
responsible parties."); cf Wickland Oil Terminals v. Asarco, Inc., 792 F.2d 887, 892 (9th
Cir. 1988) (interpreting the statute in a way that "promotes the effectiveness of private
enforcement").
63. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 11 (1989); Exxon Corp. v. Hunt,
475 U.S. 355, 371 (1986).
64. See Stanton Road Assocs. v. Lohrey Enters., 984 F.2d 1015, 1023 (9th Cir. 1993)
(Canby, J., dissenting) ("CERCLA is to a large degree a machine driven by private
litigation or the threat of it."); Stevens Creek Assoc. v. Barclays Bank, 915 F.2d 1355,
1365 (9th Cir. 1990) (Pregerson, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2014 (1991);
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Furthermore, an interpretation of sections 107(a)(4)(B) and
101(25) that would authorize only the federal government to
recover its litigation costs and attorneys' fees would render Congress' amendment of section 101(25) unnecessary in light of section 104(b)(1), which already65authorized the federal government
to collect its legal expenses.
3.

Private Party Recovery of Attorneys' Fees Furthers
CERCLA's Statutory Purposes

Finally, the Stanton Road majority refused to consider
CERCLA's underlying purposes. Congress enacted CERCLA to
serve primarily two purposes: to encourage the prompt, voluntary cleanup of hazardous substances, 6 6 and to make the parties responsible for hazardous substances pay for the cleanup.6"
Courts that interpret CERCLA sections 107(a)(4) and 101(25) to
authorize private parties as well as the federal government to
recover their attorneys' fees and litigation expenses as costs of
enforcement activities further these statutory purposes.
Courts permitting private parties to bring cost recovery
actions and to recover their litigation expenses encourage them
to clean up hazardous substances promptly and voluntarily.68
One district court concluded that
[b]y providing private parties with a federal cause of action
for the recovery of necessary expenses in the cleanup of hazardous wastes, Congress intended section 107 as a powerful
incentive for these parties to expend their own funds initially
without waiting for the responsible persons to take actions.
The court can conceive of no surer method to defeat this purpose than to require private parties to shoulder the financial
Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 805 F.2d 1074, 1082 (1st Cir.
1986); City of Philadelphia v. Stepan Chem. Co., 544 F. Supp. 1135, 1142-43 (E.D. Pa.
1982); see also Thomas C. L. Roberts, Allocation of Liability Under CERCLA: A "Carrot
& Stick" Formula, 14 EcoLOGY L.Q. 601 (1987).
65. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(b)(1)(1988). The Stanton Road majority pointed to § 104(b)(1)
as an example of Congress' ability to unambiguously authorize the recovery of
attorneys' fees. Stanton Road, 984 F.2d at 1019. Although that section does
demonstrate that Congress is capable of drafting legislation clearly, it poses the
question of why, in light of an authorization of federal legal fee recovery, Congress
amended § 101(25) to authorize the recovery of enforcement costs.
66. See Artesian Water Co. v. Government of New Castle County, 659 F. Supp.
1269, 1288 (D. Del, 1987), affd, 851 F.2d 643 (3d Cir. 1988); City of New York v. Exxon
Corp., 633 F. Supp. 609, 616-17 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
67. See Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. at 11; Dedham, 805 F.2d at 1081.
68. See General Elec. Co. v. Litton Indus. Automation Sys., 920 F.2d 1415, 1422
(8th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1390 (1991).
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burden
of the very litigation that is necessary to recover these
69
costs.

In light of the inherent limitations of federal enforcement of
CERCLA, 70 any provision encouraging voluntary cleanup of
hazardous substances is essential to the statute's effectiveness.
Furthermore, if prevailing plaintiffs in cost recovery
actions did not recover their attorneys' fees, the parties responsible for hazardous substances would not be paying all of the
costs associated with cleaning them up. 7 1 Another court
explained that
[tlhe statute clearly meant for those responsible for dumping
chemical wastes to pay for the cleanup of those wastes. If the
court narrowly read the statute ... then even innocent purchasers of property who clean up hazardous wastes and subsequently seek recovery from the responsible parties would
be unable to recover the entirety of the expenses incurred in
responsible parties accountable for their
holding the
72
pollution.
By ignoring the purposes underlying CERCLA's statutory
scheme, the Stanton Road majority failed to consider an important aid to the interpretation of sections 107(a)(4)(B) and
101(25).
IV.

CONCLUSION

In rejecting the award of attorneys' fees under CERCLA,
the Stanton Road majority eliminated a substantial incentive
designed to further Congress' goal of encouraging the prompt,
voluntary cleanup of hazardous substances. More significantly
from a jurisprudential standpoint, the majority abdicated its
responsibility to determine a reasonable interpretation of statutory provisions that were less than artfully drafted. Courts do
not have the luxury of continuing to apply common law principles once Congress has legislated on a matter. Even with
increasingly complicated and poorly drafted legislation, courts
69. Bolin v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 759 F. Supp. 692, 710 (D. Kan. 1991) (citations
omitted). The Sixth Circuit relied primarily on this language from Bolin to affirm an
award of attorneys' fees to a private party. See Donahey v. Bogle, 987 F.2d 1250, 1256
(6th Cir. 1993).
70. See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
71. See GeneralElec., 920 F.2d at 1422.
72. Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 766 F. Supp. 865, 872 (E.D. Wash. 1991),
rev'd, 984 F.2d 1025 (9th Cir. 1993).
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have an obligation to employ traditional tools of statutory analysis to determine what result Congress intended to legislate.

